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In 2001, the Fourth Circuit addressed the permit shield provision of
the Clean Water Act and found it to provide broad-scale protection for
polluters. In Piney Run Preservation Association v. County
Commissioners of Carroll County, the Fourth Circuit held that facilities
with dischargepermits are protectedfrom lawsuits even when discharging
pollutants not contained within their permits. Under this ruling, permit
holders may discharge, without fear of penalty, any disclosed pollutant
within the reasonableexpectation of the permitting authority. This decision
is worrisome because it does not protect the goals of the Clean Water Act
and deprives the public of information about what pollutants are in their
environment.
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INTRODUCTION

In Piney Run Preservation Ass'n v. County Commissioners,' the
Fourth Circuit disregarded congressional intent and the clear purpose of
the Clean Water Act (CWA or "the Act"):2 broad protection of the
nation's waters. The County Commissioners of Carroll County Maryland
admitted discharging waste heat3 into a stream called Piney Run. The
County further conceded that its discharge permit did not contain a
provision specifically granting it the right to discharge the waste heat.
Despite these admissions, the court protected the discharger under an
overly broad interpretation of the Clean Water Act's permit shield
provision. The provision protects dischargers from liability if they operate
within the terms of their permits.' The court's decision jeopardizes the
substantive goal of the CWA to protect the integrity of the nation's
waters and creates a gap in information that effectively eliminates the
public's ability to rely on discharge permits for information about
waterways. Clear guidelines as to what pollutant information must be
included in a discharge permit system in order to trigger the permit shield
would improve the permitting system and more effectively protect the
goals of the Clean Water Act.
This Note begins by providing background information on the CWA,
with specific attention to the provisions at issue in this case. Section 1I
summarizes the Fourth Circuit's decision in Piney Run, and Section III
provides a critical analysis of the decision. Finally, Section IV discusses
recommendations for improving the system to uphold the integrity of
1. 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Piney Run HI].
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2003).
3. Waste heat refers to discharged effluent that is at a higher temperature than the

receiving waterway. The exact method of calculating when an effluent is at a high enough
temperature to qualify as waste heat is not clear.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
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CWA permits and to provide documents that the public can rely on with
confidence.
1.

A.

BACKGROUND

Clean Water Act: History and Goals

Congress first began to regulate water quality in 1948 with the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.5 This act protected water quality
through ambient standards.6 These focused on "the tolerable effects
rather than the preventable causes of water pollution."' Cumbersome
enforcement procedures combined with the "awkwardly shared federal
and state responsibility for promulgating ...standards" to rob the act of
the effectiveness needed to improve the quality of the nation's waters.'
Since 1948, the act has gone through several revisions. Most
significantly, in 1972 a series of amendments created what is more
commonly known as the Clean Water Act ("the Act"). 9 The Act's main
goal is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."" The 1972 Amendments were
prompted by findings of the Senate Committee on Public Works who
found that "the Federal Water Pollution Control Program... has been
inadequate in every vital aspect.""1 When Congress enacted the
amendments, it set a national goal that "the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."2 Further, the legislature
called for an interim standard of fishable and swimmable waters by
1983.3 New enforcement procedures accompanied these ambitious goals
to facilitate achieving them.
B.

Clean Water: Act Enforcement Mechanisms

The Clean Water Act states that "the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful."' 4 A discharge is defined as "any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." 15 CWA

5. Pub L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.
6. For a comprehensive history of the Clean Water Act see EPA v. California ex. rel. State
Water Res. ControlBd., 426 U.S. 200. 202-05 (1976) [hereinafter SWRCB].
7. Id. at 202.
8. Id.
9. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.

816.
10.
11.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2003).
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3674.

12.
13.
14.
15.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
Id. § 1251(a)(2).
Id. § 1311(a).
Id. § 1362(12)(A).
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imposes restrictions on dischargers by setting maximum levels of
pollutants that facilities may release into navigable waters, known as
effluent limitations.1 6 The Act also includes a requirement to achieve
acceptable water quality standards.17 The Supreme Court has explained
that these "direct restrictions on discharges facilitate enforcement by
making it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of
water to determine which point sources are responsible and which must
be abated."18
To carry out its goal of zero discharge and to establish national
standards, Congress created the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program. 9 NPDES permits list
types and amounts of pollutants that entities may emit into navigable
waterways.2 ° The statute provides a mechanism whereby the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can delegate this authority to
states, so long as the state programs meet federal standards.2 1 In crafting a
permit, the permitting authority must consider two central concepts. The
Clean Water Act requires that "every permit contain (1) effluent
limitations that reflect the pollution reduction achievable by using
technologically practicable controls and (2) any more stringent pollutant
the waterway receiving the pollutant to
release limitations necessary for
' 22
standards.'
quality
meet 'water
To obtain a permit, a facility must complete an application." The
permitting authority then reviews the application and other information
to decide whether to issue the permit. 24 The final issued permit draws on
facts from the application, knowledge about the facility type and area in
25
general, and information from past permits held by the facility.
Applicants are required to disclose information about all pollutants that

16.

SWRCB, supra note 6. at 204.

17. Id.
18. Id. The Court goes on to say that "a discharger's performance is now measured against
strict technology-based effluent limitations -specified levels of treatment-to which it must
conform, rather than against limitations derived from water quality standards to which it and

other polluters must collectively conform." Id at 204-05.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
20.
21.
22.

40 C.F.R. § 122.1 (2002).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) for description of state permit programs.
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing 33 U.S.C. §

1311(b)(1)) (internal citations omitted). The court in Piney Run III was only concerned with the
second element - examining the impact of heat discharge on water quality standards. Whether
the heat discharge met the technology-based standard was not discussed.
23. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21.

24. EPA, EPA OFFICE OF WATER NPDES PROGRAM PRIMER, available at
http://cfpubl.epa.gov/npdes/docs.cfm?document-type-id=3&view=Factsheets%20and%20Outre
ach%20Materials&program-id=45&sort=name (last visited July 8, 2003).
25. 40 C.F.R. § 124.3; In re Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 1998 EPA App. LEXIS 85
(Envtl. Appeals Board 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/diskll/ketchikan05l598.pdf.
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they expect to discharge during the term of the permit.26 The issuing
authority considers this information to develop specific guidelines for
each permit on a facility-by-facility basis. Often, facilities provide
information about potential pollutants that do not end up regulated in the
final issued permit.2"
To provide for stability and predictability in the permitting system,
the Clean Water Act also contains a permit shield provision, which
protects dischargers from CWA liability if they operate within the terms
of their permits.2 8 The EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), in
In re Ketchikan Pulp Co., described the pollutants specifically listed in the
permit as "express permit terms," while those disclosed but not included
as "implicit terms."29 The EAB proclaimed that as long as an applicant is
truthful and thorough in her disclosures, she will be shielded from
liability even for pollutants not listed in the permit." The EAB in
Ketchikan, just like the Fourth Circuit in Piney Run, acknowledged that
the pollutants at issue were not explicitly contained in the permit. The
EAB also concluded that the pollutants were not implicitly included
because they were not disclosed in the permit application. As the
pollutants discharged were not contained in the permit explicitly or
implicitly, Ketchikan Pulp Company's permit did not shield them from
liability.
II.

PINEY RUN CASE SUMMARY

When members of the Piney Run Preservation Association (PRPA)
discovered that Carroll County's sewage treatment plant was discharging
heated wastewater into Piney Run, the group brought an enforcement
action under the Clean Water Act. The facility's NPDES permit did not
list heat as an allowed pollutant. 1 Despite this, the Fourth Circuit held
that the plant's discharge was shielded from liability under the CWA.32
Because the Fourth Circuit was persuaded that the County had disclosed
the thermal pollution during its permit application process, it found that
the permitting authority reasonably contemplated the plant would
discharge heat.33 Additionally, the court held that because the plant's heat
discharges were not beyond the permitting authority's reasonable
expectation, the County was not subject to liability.' In light of this
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357-58 (2d
Cir. 1994).

28. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2003).
supra note 1, at 266.
29. Piney Run III,
30. Ketchikan, 7 E.A.D. 605.
31. Id.
32. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 264.
33. Id.at 271.
34. Id. at 272.
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holding, when a permit holder discloses a potential pollutant to the
permitting agency, she is not in violation of the CWA for emitting the
pollutant even if the pollutant is not included in her final permit.
A.

FactualBackground

Piney Run is a small stream in Maryland. Its headwaters lie near the
border of Carroll and Baltimore counties.35 Maryland has certified Piney

Run as a Class III P stream, meaning that it merits protection as a source
of public drinking water and is capable of supporting a self-sustaining
trout population.36 Carroll County owns and operates a wastewater
treatment plant that discharges treated wastewater into Piney Run.37 The
facility is subject to the CWA and is required to operate pursuant to an

NPDES permit issued under Section 402 of the Act.3" The Maryland
Department of the Environment (MDE), the state agency authorized to
issue NPDES permits by the EPA,39 has issued permits to the plant since

1975 with the most recent permit granted in 1990.'
Heat or thermal pollution can significantly impact aquatic species.4"
Elevated water temperatures affect stream flora and fauna. According to
reports submitted to the district court, the temperature of the plant
effluent exceeded the upstream ambient temperature on 371 of 397
days.42 Dr. Stauffer, an ichthyologist who testified in the lower court,
explained that higher temperatures can be detrimental to the brown trout
populations found in Carroll and Baltimore counties.43 In particular,
warmer waters inhibit spawning and discourage trout migration.'
Additionally, increased temperatures can lead to algae proliferation.
35. Id. at 259.
36. Id. at 259-60.
37. Id. at 260.
38. EPA, WATER DISCHARGE PERMITS, PERMIT NUMBER: MD0022446 or 88-DP-0594, at
http://oaspub.epa.govlenviro/lpcs-del-reports.pcs-tstnpdesid=MD0022446&npvalue-1&npvalu
e=2&npvalue=3&npvalue=4&npvalue=5&rvalue= 12&npvalue=6&npvalue=7&npvalue=9&npva
lue=10&npvalue=ll (last updated Jun. 18, 2003).
39. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 260.
40. Id. At the time this case was heard, MDE was in the process of reviewing the plant and
working on a new permit. Although the 1990 permit expired in 1995, it remains the governing
discharge permit until MDE issues a new one. Id. at 260 n.3.
41.

EPA,

OFFICE

OF

RESEARCH

AND

MONITORING,

CONTROLLING

THERMAL

POLLUTION IN SMALL STREAMS, EPA-R2-72-83 7 (1972); Effects and Methods of Control of
Thermal Discharges:Report to the Congress by the EPA in Accordance with Section 104(t) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 Part I-Committee Print-Serial No.
93-14 24 (Nov. 1973) [hereinafter Effects and Methods].
42. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs of Carroll County, 50 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445
(D. Md. 1999) [hereinafter Piney Run I].
43. Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs of Carroll County, 82 F. Supp. 2d 464. 46869 (D. Md. 2000) [hereinafter Piney Run I].
44. Id. at 469.
45. Effects and Methods, supra note 41, at 32.
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The broader ecosystem effects of temperature increases are unknown and
potentially grave.46 Indisputably, thermal pollution makes it more difficult
to achieve the CWA's goal of fishable and swimmable waters because of
these effects.47
PRPA filed its lawsuit under Section 505 of the Clean Water Act48 in
1998, claiming that the Facility's NPDES permit prohibited the release of
thermal pollution.49 Although heat is a statutory pollutant under the
CWA,50 it was not listed in Carroll County's 1990 permit as one of the
allowed discharges.5 ' PRPA argued that permit holders should be liable
for discharges of any pollutants not expressly allowed by their permits. 2
PRPA asserted that the County was in violation of its permit when it
discharged any level of heat.
B.

The DistrictCourt's Opinion

The District Court of Maryland had to decide the test for whether
and when an addition of heat to Piney Run constituted a permit violation.
By drawing upon Maryland's state water quality standards, the court
determined that heat constituted a pollutant in violation of CWA when
the plant discharged effluent with a temperature exceeding either sixtyeight degrees Fahrenheit or the ambient temperature of Piney Run.53
Using this rubric, the court found that there were 290 temperature
violations of the NPDES permit.54
The district court decided that because the permit did not expressly
authorize the discharge, the County was liable under the Clean Water
Act." The court enjoined the County from further violations, awarded

46.

John P. Barlow, The Aquatic Environment, in THERMAL POLLUTION: A SHORT

COURSE 37-49 (Jeff Romm ed., 1970).
47. Congress recognized the potentially deleterious impact of thermal pollution and
created Section 316 of the CWA. which calls for regulation of thermal pollution. 33 U.S.C. §
1326 (2003).
48. Id. § 1365.
49. Piney Run 111, supra note 1, at 260.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
51. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 260-61.
52. Id. at 261.
53. Id.
54. Piney Run II, supra note 43, at 469. The data presented by PRPA in Piney Run I
finding 371 violations was disputed. Ultimately, the court was only able to confirm 107 of those
violations. However, in between the oral arguments for Piney Run I and Piney Run II, the
County discharged heat in violation of the state standards 183 more times. This led to a total
liability for 290 violations when the District Court ruled on Piney Run I1in February 2000.
55. Piney Run I11, supra note 1, at 259.
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costs and fees to PRPA, and assessed $400,000 in civil penalties. 6 Both
PRPA and the County appealed the decision.57
C.

The Fourth Circuit's Opinion

The scope of the Clean Water Act's permit shield provision was the

central issue on appeal. 8 The question before the court in this case was
the precise meaning of "operating within the terms of their permit" for
purposes of triggering the permit shield. The district court concluded that
the shield provision did not protect against liability for pollutants not
expressly allowed by a permit.5 9 Conversely, Carroll County claimed that
the permit shield defense bars liability for the discharge of any pollutants
not expressly regulated by the permit.' The Fourth Circuit found that
neither interpretation was correct, instead holding that although the
CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants not contained in the permit,
the dischargers' protection from liability is not as narrow as the district
court asserted. 6' According to the Fourth Circuit, when a permit holder

discloses a potential pollutant to the permitting agency and the agency
can reasonably anticipate its discharge, the permittee is shielded from
liability, regardless of whether the pollutant was specifically identified in

the permit.6"
To determine the scope of the permit shield provision, the court
applied the two-step analysis outlined in Chevron v. Natural Resources

Defense Council.6 3 The first prong of the test calls for examination of the
language of the statute and asks whether Congress has spoken to the

precise question at issue.' If Congress has spoken on the precise
question, the analysis is over. However, if Congress' intent on the issue is

56. Id. at 260.
57. This case was before Wilkins, King and Gregory in the Fourth Circuit. Judge King
wrote the unanimous opinion. The appellate court reviewed issues of law de novo just as it would
in any contract or legal document issue. Id. at 269. It reviewed the district court's findings of
facts with respect to extrinsic matters for clear error. Id.
58. The Fourth Circuit also considered other issues raised on appeal by the parties relating
to the number of violations, PRPA's standing, and an argument that the district court should not
have heard the case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, under which courts defer to the
regulating agency on technical questions implicating agency expertise. Discussion of these issues
is beyond the scope of this Note.
59. Id. at 266.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 269.
63. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. Id. at 842. Generally, when courts draw upon step one of the Chevron doctrine, they
examine both the language of the statute and whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue.
In this case, however, the Fourth Circuit considered whether Congress had spoken to the precise
question at issue only by examining the language of the statute. In step one of its Chevron
analysis, it did not go beyond the four corners of the statute. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 267.
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ambiguous, the court then turns to the regulating agency's interpretation
of the statute and, if reasonable, the court defers to this interpretation."66
Here, the Fourth Circuit found the language of the statute ambiguous.
Specifically, the court examined the permit shield provision, Section
402(k), which states only that "[c]ompliance with a permit issued
pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance., 67 The court found
that Section 402(k) was ambiguous because it did not "explicitly explain
the scope of the permit protection."' The court then turned to the EPA's
interpretation of the shield provision to determine its reasonableness.
To establish the EPA's interpretation of the statute, the court looked
69
to the 1998 EAB adjudication proceeding In re Ketchikan Pulp Co. In
that proceeding, the EAB interpreted NPDES permits as protecting
facilities from liability for all pollutants they disclosed to the permitting
authority during the application process.7" Although the discharger in that
case was not shielded from liability because the pollutant had not been
disclosed, the EAB clearly stated that "discharges.. .are not
automatically prohibited just because they are not specifically allowed
under an NPDES permit."7 Because the EPA had earlier acknowledged
that "it is impossible to identify and rationally limit every chemical or
compound present in a discharge of pollutants,"72 the EAB concluded
that "the goals of the CWA may be more effectively achieved by focusing
on the chief pollutants and waste streams established in effluent
guidelines and disclosed by permittees in their permit applications."7 The
Fourth Circuit relied upon the Ketchikan decision to assert that a permit
holder maintains compliance with the CWA even if it discharges
pollutants not included in the permit, as long as those pollutants were
disclosed to the permitting authority during the application process. 4
Beyond disclosure, the only other requirement the Fourth Circuit
established for asserting the permit shield defense is that the permitting
authority must reasonably anticipate the discharges." Drawing upon
65.
66.
67.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 267.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2003).

68. Piney Run III, supra note 1,at 267.

69. The Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) is the final EPA decision maker on
administrative appeals under all major environmental statutes that EPA administers.
70. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 267.
71. In re Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 62L, 1998 EPA App. LEXIS 85, at *38 (Envtl.
Appeals Board 1998), availableat http://www.epa.gov/eab/disk11/ketchikan051598.pdf.
72. Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water
Enforcement, to Regional Enforcement Director, Region V, at 2 (Apr. 28, 1976) [hereinafter
Memo]).
73. Ketchikan, 7 E.A.D. 605,618, 1998 EPA App. LEXIS 85, at *33 (emphasis added).
74. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 268.
75. Id.
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Chevron, the court claimed to be adhering to the EPA's interpretation,
which calls for the permit holder to comply with both express and implicit
permit terms. Dischargers violate implicit permit terms when they make
discharges "not within the reasonable contemplation of the permitting
authority at the time the permit was issued."76 In this case, the Fourth
Circuit found that the discharge of heat had been within the reasonable
contemplation of MDE at the time MDE issued the 1990 permit.77 Thus,
the County would only have violated its permit if the permit specifically
barred heat or if the County had not disclosed the possibility of thermal
pollution during the permitting process."
III.

CRITICISMS OF THE PINEY RUN DECISION

The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Piney Run raises a host of concerns.
Especially worrisome is the impact this case could have on public
disclosure and the availability of pollutant information to those affected
by the pollutants. Additionally, considering the broad congressional
objective to protect the nation's water and eliminate discharges of
pollutants, the decision appears to defy legislative intent. Further, the
Fourth Circuit's decision does not lay out clear rules for subsequent
courts to follow. Relying upon vague ideas of "reasonableness" and
"adequacy," this ruling indicates that subsequent decisions will have to be
determined on case-by-case bases.
A.

This Decision has a Negative Effect on Public Disclosure

The most important concern about the nature of permits arising in
the wake of Piney Run is its implications for public disclosure of pollution
information. The requirements laid out by the Fourth Circuit require
disclosure of pollutants to the permitting agency, not to the public. In
light of this decision, it will be more difficult for community members to
learn which pollutants they are being exposed to, with little hope of
redress against the discharger.
Both the Piney Run court and the Ketchikan EAB allowed permits
to shield dischargers from liability for pollutants that they "adequately"

76. Id. at 259.
77. Id. at 271.
78. One complicating element is a footnote in the permit, which states that the "discharge
of pollutants not shown shall be illegal." Id. at 269. PRPA invoked this footnote in their
assertion that the permit specifically bars thermal pollution. Id. The County claimed, however,
that the footnote refers only to pollutants not disclosed during the permitting process. Id.
Because the footnote is ambiguous, the court turned to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 270. Examining
the footnote in the light of the permit and in particular the permitting process, the court sided
with the County's interpretation. Id. The district court's decision was therefore vacated and
remanded.

2003]

PINEY RUN v. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

disclosed, but neither decision defined "adequately." 79 In Ketchikan, the
EAB suggested that inclusion of a pollutant in a permit application would
constitute disclosure, but the case left the door open for other types of
disclosure. In Piney Run, the disclosure deemed "adequate" by the court
was adequate to inform the permitting agency of the County's heat
pollution, but not adequate to alert the public. Neither the County nor
MDE informed the public of the heat discharges. Although the County
routinely recorded and reported the water's temperatures, the thermal
pollution was not realized until PRPA tested the stream and requested
the County's temperature data.8" The County did not list heat in any of
the documents associated with its permit application.8 The court found
"adequate disclosure" by relying on testimony from the County and from
one MDE employee who was not part of the original permit process in
1990. These witnesses claimed that the MDE knew of the heat discharges,
but there is no written record of that disclosure. 2 Therefore, the public
could have discovered this potential for heat pollution only by
interviewing the County Commissioners and MDE employees. Although
the facility regularly reported temperatures to MDE, to obtain copies
community members must file a request through the Maryland Public
Information Act. However, if a pollutant is not mentioned in a permit,
there is nothing to alert them of the need to request such documents.
Thus, to learn of unlisted pollutants, community members must test water
themselves and investigate suspected facilities.
If the public seeks to learn about the state of waterways, it is difficult
to obtain information about pollutants disclosed to agencies but not
included on permits. Discharge permits are available to the public
through local agencies and the EPA, and both the state of Maryland and
the EPA provide watershed information to citizens.5 3 This watershed
information allows citizens to access some data regarding facility
79. Id. at 271; In re Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 606, 1998 EPA App. LEXIS 85, at
*38 (Envtl. Appeals Board 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/diskll/ketchikan051598.
pdf.
80. Telephone Interview with G. Macy Nelson, Attorney for PRPA (Dec. 16, 2002); Brief
supra note I (on file with author).
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 7-9, Piney Run I11,
81. Even Maryland Public Information Act requests fail to reveal any disclosures to MDE
that the facility made regarding heat. This author filed Public Information Act requests as
allowed by Maryland state law to obtain permit materials. Although congenial. the Maryland
Department of the Environment took two months to say that they were not sure what
documents were submitted before the permit was issued. Indeed, even a copy of the permit
files and allow citizens to look
application was difficult to find. However, the MDE does open its
through the documents, so this process is undoubtedly much easier for someone who is local to
the area. If a citizen would like information sent to her, it can result in high copying and mailing
fees, which represent another obstacle to learning about pollutants entering waterways.
82. Interview with Nelson, supra note 80.
83. Listings of all NPDES permits are available on the EPA's website, www.epa.gov/npdes.
NPDES permits functioning in the State of Maryland are available on MDE's website,
www.mde.state.md.us.
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discharges into waterways, but it does not include pollutants disclosed to
the agency during the permitting process that were not later listed in the
final permit. Thus, when citizens seek information about water quality in
their region through ordinary channels, they get an incomplete picture.
For a true accounting of their waterways, citizens must file detailed public
information requests to state and federal agencies. Although the
Freedom of Information Act and similar state statutes make the
information theoretically available to citizens, it is a slow, burdensome
process, and it is difficult to determine when information requests are
necessary.
Since the Clean Water Act's passage in 1972, the common
conception was that permits issued under the Act listed all pollutants
being discharged by a facility.' 4 Piney Run proves this isn't so. Permits are
not the comprehensive documents they are assumed to be. When citizens
have successfully filed FOIA requests and received information, they
often have found that several unlisted pollutants (including toxic ones)
are in their waterways." Too often, however, curious citizens lack access
to this information. The burdensome paperwork involved in such a
request militates against the Clean Water Act's goals of community
participation and access to knowledge about pollutants that affect it. Yet,
it is clear that Congress intended the public to participate in the
permitting process. The CWA calls for notice to the public and
opportunity for public comment and review before permit approval.86 It
clearly contemplates an active role for citizens by providing for citizen
enforcement of the act through Section 505 citizen suits.8 7 The structure
of the statutory scheme suggests that Congress did not entirely trust the
government agency.88 Public disclosure and transparency are essential to
making this scheme work effectively.
The Fourth's Circuit's decision effectively disregards the goals of the
public information provisions intended by Congress. The Fourth Circuit's
broad interpretation of the permit shield provision is in direct opposition
84. See, e.g., Robert W. Vinal, Proof of Wrongful Discharge of Pollutant into Waterway
Under Federal Clean Water Act, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 533, § 4 (2002); WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER, §4.30 (B) (2002).

85. In fact, the Eastman Kodak case grew out of a citizen group's FOIA request discovery
of toxics. Charlie Tebbut, the Plaintiffs' lawyer in Eastman Kodak, says that they learned about
scores of toxics being discharged into numerous New York waters during the course of the
litigation. Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statues and PlanetaryPrograms:
How EPA has Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 253, 255-56 (1993).
86. 33 U.S.C. §1342(b)(3) (2003).
87. Id. § 1365.
88. At many times, both Congress and the courts have shown their distrust for agencies.
The belief is that scarce agency resources, political pressure, and agency capture would likely
lead to un-enforcement of environmental statutes if the agency is left to its own devices.
STEPHEN BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY 350-353 (4th ed.

1999).
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to the ideals of public disclosure that allow people to tailor their behavior
based upon knowledge of their environment. The thermal pollution
discharged into Piney Run, for example, might have been known to the
agency and the facility when the permit was issued in 1990. However,
citizens who entered the discussion after 1990 missed out. To let
disclosure to the agency alone shield the discharger from liability
countenances the private deal-making that Congress sought to avoid.
This becomes of augmented concern as permitting backlogs increase.
Permits that were intended to last five years have been stretched to more
than twice as long.89 For example, the County's permit expired in early
1995, but in 2001, MDE still had not issued a new permit.90 Thus, most
people will not have the opportunity to respond to the pollution they
confront in their waterways. The Fourth Circuit's decision not only flies
in the face of the goals of the Clean Water Act, but it works against the
more general government goal of providing the public with access to
information about their environment.
B.

The Decision Ignores CongressionalIntent Behind the CWA

The plain language of the Clean Water Act demonstrates that
Congress intended discharges to be limited by the permits that govern
them. The Act states that "[e]xcept as in compliance with [CWA sections
establishing technology standards, effluent limitations, water quality
standards and the NPDES permit system], the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful."91 The reasonable way to read this
language is that dischargers are only allowed to release effluents as
specifically described in their permit.92 A discharge is defined as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."93

The parties and the court in Piney Run acknowledge that the sewage
treatment facility was a point source discharging a pollutant not listed in
its permit into a navigable waterway covered by the Clean Water Act.94
On the face of the statute and the facts of the case, it appears that the
County clearly violated the CWA. However, the Fourth Circuit found the
statutory framework more ambiguous. The Second Circuit also dismissed
plain language arguments under similar circumstances in Atlantic States
Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak.' That court saw the prohibition on
89. EPA, NPDES Backlog Reduction, at http:tlcfpubl.epa.gov/npdes/permitissuancel
backlog.cfm (last updated Oct. 30, 2002).
90. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 260 n.3.
91, 33U.S.C § 1311(a).
92. See id. § 1342. This is further supported by other elements of the Act that call for strict
liability and inability of dischargers to use de minimis defenses. Vinal, supra note 84, §§ 6, 26.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A).
94. Piney Run I, supra note 42, at 445.
95. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993).
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discharge of pollutants as "tempered ...by a self-referential host of
exceptions that allow the discharge of many pollutants once a polluter has
complied with the regulatory programs of the [Clean Water Act]." ' One
exception the Second Circuit referred to is Section 402 of the Act (the
NPDES permit program).97 Thus, the Second Circuit viewed the existence
of the permit system itself as evidence that the statutory goals of the Act
expressed by the prohibition of discharges in Section 301 were not
intended to be all-encompassing.9" Like the Piney Run Court, the
Eastman Kodak Court held that as long as facilities fully disclose their
pollutants during the permitting process, their NPDES permits shield
them from suit even for pollutants not listed.99 Although the Piney Run
Court did not directly rely on Eastman Kodak, the EAB found that
decision particularly informative and drew on it for its reasoning in
Ketchikan.1" The Piney Run Court, in turn, relied on Ketchikan.
Eastman Kodak, however, should not have had such persuasive
effect on the EAB. The case led to several scholarly articles
demonstrating the Second Circuit's incompatibility with congressional
intent and the potential harms that likely will result from such an
interpretation."0 ' The Clean Water Act is a broad-ranging statute with the
ambitious goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants. This zerodischarge policy is further supplemented by a strict liability standard,
which courts have read to disallow even de minimis defenses." 2 Until
Eastman Kodak, most courts viewed permits as containing a complete list
of the allowed pollutants.0 3 Since Eastman Kodak and Ketchikan,' ° this
view has been changing. Some scholars believe that these decisions were
incorrect because of their lack of attention to congressional intent. 5 In
Eastman Kodak, instead of examining the congressional intent behind the
96. Id. at 357.
97. Id.
98. Following the logic laid out by the Second Circuit in Eastman Kodak, the yery element
of the Act designed to be the enforcement mechanism for achieving its goals can be used as
justification for lax enforcement99. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d at 356.
100. In re Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 1998 EPA App. LEXIS 85 (Envtl. Appeals
Board 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/diskl 1/ketchikan051598.pdf.
101. See e-g., Axline & McGinley, supra note 85, at 282-84 (arguing that the decision turns
the regulatory framework scheme on its head and criticizing the Second Circuit for not
examining the text of the statute when making their decision); Joanna Bowen, Note, Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Second Circuit Affirms the NPDES
Permit as a Shield and Tries to Sink the Clean Water Act. 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 269 (1994)
(explaining that the decision frustrates the broad purposes of protecting waterways under the
Clean Water Act).
102. See e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir.
1992).
103. Axline & McGinley. supra note 85.
104. Ketchikan, 7 E.A.D.605.
105. See e.g., Axline & McGinley, supra note 85.
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Clean Water Act as called for in the first step of Chevron analysis, the
Second Circuit deferred to agency interpretation. To demonstrate the
EPA's view of the Act the court examined a memo from an EPA deputy
assistant administrator and comments made in reaction to a proposed
regulation. Not only do these types of documents not merit Chevron
deference, but because the congressional intent is clear, they need not
have been examined in the first place.
In Piney Run and Eastman Kodak, the Second and Fourth Circuits
deferred to agency interpretation without examining whether the agency
was in line with the original congressional intent behind the authorizing
statute. Eastman Kodak got it wrong, and Ketchikan was wrong when it
relied on it. The same error persists in Piney Run. The only way to meet
the ambitious goal of the CWA is through stringent enforceable
restrictions. The notion that facilities can discharge pollutants not
specifically listed in their permits cuts squarely against the
comprehensive anti-pollution intent of the Clean Water Act.
C.

This Decision Does Not Provide Clear Guidancefor Future Courts

.The Fourth Circuit based its holding on the theory that the County
adequately disclosed the potential discharge of heat and that the
discharge levels were reasonably foreseeable to the permitting authority.
This "reasonably foreseeable" doctrine is questionable as a guideline. It
seems to contradict earlier statements made by the court. According to
the Fourth Circuit, it is not necessary that every substance discharged
from a point source be included in a permit because it is difficult to
measure everything and create a list of everything in an effluent."° But if
these pollutants are difficult to detect, how can their discharge levels be
foreseeable? In this case, the court found that the heat discharge was
reasonably foreseeable."0 7 In fact, there is no clear evidence that heat was
ever disclosed in this case. The Fourth Circuit relied upon oral testimony
of a representative of the discharging facility and a statement by an
agency employee who did not work for the permitting authority in 1990
when the permit was written and issued."' Even if the evidence clearly
established that the County did disclose the potential for heat pollution, if
heat was foreseeable, the agency should have included it in the permit.
106. Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 267-68.
107. Id. at 271.
108. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 80, at 20. However, the County's NPDES
permit requires it to submit monthly reports to MDE. Piney Run I, supra note 42, at 445. Among
other things, these reports include the temperatures of the "plant influent, plant effluent, stream
above the outfall, and stream sixty feet below the outfall." Id. This reporting requirement seems
to indicate that MDE contemplated thermal issues when composing the permit. These reports
clearly showed evidence of thermal pollution. In fact, these reports were used by PRPA to
determine the instances of heat pollution at the district court. Id.
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Additionally, the court failed to provide guidance for determining
what is reasonably foreseeable in future cases. Nor did the court explain
the term "adequately disclose" or lay out rules for what should be
considered adequate disclosure."° This will bring permits into the court
for a case-by-case determination of what type of disclosure is adequate
and what types of discharge are reasonably foreseeable. In general, this
case does little to settle the debate because it leaves the most important
terms vaguely defined.
IV.

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Substantive Recommendations

The EPA should resolve the precise scope of the permit-shield
provision through notice and comment rulemaking. The judiciary is not
the appropriate branch of government for deciding whether pollutant
discharges are reasonably foreseeable. Permitting is a technical process
that should account for scientific limits on measurement techniques. It is
best to leave technical consideration of this kind to the administrative
agencies. Instead of the courts deciding what should belong in the permit,
there should be a thorough notice and comment rulemaking. With notice
and comment rulemaking, the EPA informs interested parties of the
potential new rule and those parties can participate in the process of
determining what the rules governing permits should be. In general, full
notice and comment rulemaking is a better indication of the agency's
authoritative interpretation and should be entitled to a higher level of
deference than a single EAB adjudication.11 With a notice and comment
process, environmental groups, industry experts and concerned citizens
will all be able to take part. The Piney Run Court recognized that
agencies are the superior decision-making entity when it chose to follow
the precedent of the Ketchikan Court as an indicator of agency
interpretation. Although the court followed some correct logic in
attempting to defer to the agency, the Ketchikan decision was not so
worthy of deference. The EAB adjudication was not accompanied by a
thorough rulemaking process with public participation and notice and
comment opportunities. In 1994, the EPA issued a policy statement
which it used as the basis for its decision in Ketchikan."' That policy
109.
110.

Piney Run III, supra note 1, at 264.
See BREYER, supra note 88, at 667-68; see also United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co.,

410 U.S. 224 (1973). Normally, the EPA acts primarily through rulemaking, with adjudications

playing only a secondary role.
111. Based on Mead Corp., policy statements like this one are not entitled Chevron
deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The highest level of deference
appropriate to a policy statement would be Skidmore deference arising out of a 1944 Supreme
Court case. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). Skidmore deference is a weak
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statement, which also was not created through notice and comment
rulemaking, stated that permits shield a discharger from liability for
"pollutants for which the permit authority has not established limits or
other permit conditions, but which are specifically identified as present in
facility discharges during the permit application process.""' 2 This does not
promote the goals of transparency and public participation. The EPA
should recognize the need for a more formal procedure for the permitting
process and promulgate a new regulation. Such a regulation would be the
appropriate agency interpretation for courts to defer to.
B.

ProceduralRecommendations

There are multiple options for creating a standard for the permitting
process superior to the one established by the Fourth Circuit in Piney
Run. This section explains four possible options for consideration by the
EPA in regulation promulgation that would help create a clearer process.
1.

List Only Key CriteriaPollutants

If, as the EPA asserts, listing all the pollutants being discharged is
not feasible, there at least should be a clear set of criteria for particularly
harmful pollutants that permits must always include. Akin to the
regulations on hazardous substances," 3 permits would be required to list
pollutants of special concern. The current regulations guiding the NPDES
permit process include detailed reporting requirements for a myriad of
pollutants." 4 The EPA could go beyond the mere requirement that
facilities must disclose pollutants during the permit application process
and always regulate each of these pollutants in every NPDES permit.
Although this would not necessarily lead to a complete permit, members
of the public would have access to the list and know exactly which "key
criteria" pollutants are being monitored and which are not. Additionally,
states could build upon the requirement and make more stringent
regulations by adding more pollutants to the EPA's list." 5
deference to the agency giving courts authority to treat agency's interpretation as having more
authority than that of some other litigant if they so choose. Id. Therefore, an adjudication based
upon a policy statement rests upon uneasy grounds and merits closer scrutiny when using it as a
basis for agency deference.
112, Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator for Water, et al., to
Regional Administrators and Counsels, Subject: Policy Statement on the Scope of Discharge
Authorization and Shield Association with NPDES Permits (July 1, 1994), at
http:/lwww.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm6l5.pdf. This makes the present situation unclear because
there were actually permit conditions related to the thermal pollution (reporting requirements).
113. See e.g. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C. § 7408
(2003).
114. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (2002).
115. The official list of pollutants which carry reporting requirements appears in Appendix
D of 40 CFR Part 122.
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List Absolutely Everything

A more stringent option would be to require the listing of all
pollutants being discharged. Although some facilities and agency officials
argue that this would be difficult to do because of scientific limits on
testing," 6 there is precedent for a measure of this kind. For example, the
1899 Refuse Act"' (and, I have argued, Section 301 of the CWA) prohibit
the discharge of any matter into the Nation's navigable waters except
with a federal permit. Permits would be required to list every pollutant
coming out of a discharger's outfall pipes. This policy is justified by the
fact that the dischargers are in the best position to know what pollutants
they are emitting. It would solve problems of transparency and a
community's ability to know to what it is being exposed, and it may not
be as technologically or economically difficult as opponents suggest.
3. List Everything DetectableBy The Best Available Analysis
Techniques
One possibility that would fit in well with the other Clean Water Act
procedures would be to set a technological listing standard. Dischargers
already have to use the best available technology economically
achievable for effluent controls."' The EPA could implement a similar
policy for testing effluent for the presence of pollutants to establish
permit elements -dischargers would have to test for the presence of
pollutants with the best available testing technology. The EPA debated
this possibility during regulation formation but felt that it was
unnecessary." 9 A reinvigoration of this notion could serve to combat the
public policy concerns with the current procedure.
4.

Add an Appendix of Unregulated Pollutants

A fourth option might be the easiest to implement. The permitting
agencies could simply list all pollutants disclosed during the permitting
process, which did not end up in the final permit because their levels were
below state standards. This could take the form of an appendix to the
permit. This recommendation does not require any additional data
collection, because the CWA already requires that all pollutants must be
disclosed during the permitting process. 20 The discharger must reveal the
potential for release and estimate the amount of pollutant likely to be

116.

Memo, stpra note 72.

117.
118.
119.
120.

33 U.S.C. § 407 (2003).
Id.§ 1311(b).
See Memo, supra note 72; 45 Fed. Reg. 33,516 (May 19, 1980).
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b)(1)(C)(ii).
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contained in the effluent. t2 The benefit of increased transparency
outweighs any minimal agency or industry inconvenience.
CONCLUSION

The Clean Water Act is a far-reaching statute with an aim to protect
the nation's water with an eventual goal of all waterways being fishable
and swimmable. Recent judicial decisions have detracted from the Clean
Water Act's scope, narrowing its jurisdiction.' While Piney Run follows
the trend of an earlier Second Circuit decision and defers to the agency
interpretation of the CWA, it neglects, and therefore conflicts with, the
congressional intent behind the Act. Congress' goal of clean waters
becomes harder to reach after Piney Run. Further, problems of
transparency and public information arise that will make NPDES permits
and the permitting process less meaningful to the public. In light of the
Piney Run decision, citizens being subjected to unpermitted pollutants
have little venue for redress. If a permitting agency erroneously grants an
incomplete permit and a facility discharges harmful pollutants, citizens
will have no recourse. The permit shield defense will now prevent them
from suing the discharger, and the citizen suit provision in the CWA does
not allow individuals to bring suits against the permitting agency. The
situation could be improved by authoritative EPA notice and comment
rulemaking restoring a limited scope to the permit shield provision, or by
adding procedures to provide more information to the concerned public.

121. See EPA, NPDES Permit Applications and Forms, at http://cfpubl.epa.gov/npdes/
doctype.cfm?sort=name&program_id=45&document-type-id=8 (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
122. See, e-g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (limiting meaning of navigable waters in the CWA to exclude
isolated intrastate waters used by migratory birds).
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